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Abstract 
 
It has been suggested that political distrust is associated with lower levels of voter 
turnout and increased votes for challenger or populist parties. We investigate the 
relationship between political (dis)trust and electoral behaviour using the 2009 
Belgian Election Study. Belgium presents an interesting case because compulsory 
voting (with an accompanying turnout rate of 90.4 per cent) compels distrusting 
voters to participate in elections. Nevertheless, distrusting voters are significantly 
more inclined to cast a blank or invalid vote. Second, distrust is positively associated 
with a preference for extreme right (Vlaams Belang) and populist (Lijst Dedecker) 
parties. Third, in party systems where there is no supply of viable challengers (i.e. the 
French-speaking region of Belgium), the effect of political trust on party preference is 
limited. We conclude that electoral effects of political distrust are determined by the 
electoral and party system and the supply of electoral protest. 
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S U M M A R Y 
 
Introduction 
Empirical research has provided quite convincing evidence that (a lack of) political 
trust has strong effects on electoral behaviour. Low levels of political trust indicate 
that citizens, on average, have a negative perception of the way the political system in 
their country functions. This dissatisfaction will also have an effect on the way 
citizens behave when they have the opportunity to voice their political preferences. A 
first possibility is that dissatisfied citizens will use the exit option, i.e. that they will no 
longer participate at all. There is a positive relationship between political trust and 
voter turnout (Grönlund and Setälä 2007), and in the United States, for example, the 
structural decline in political trust has been invoked as one of the main reasons for the 
observed drop in voter turnout (Shaffer 1981; see however Hetherington 1999). A 
second option is that dissatisfied voters will voice their discontent by voting for 
populist or extremist parties. Low levels of political trust have indeed been identified 
as one of the main voting motives for extreme right and populist parties (Billiet and 
De Witte 1995; Denemark and Bowler 2002; Pauwels 2010). A third possibility is 
that, in spite of their distrust, they will opt for loyalty by supporting a mainstream 
political party. The latter possibility can particularly be expected in a system without 
viable exit or voice options (Hirschman 1970). 
 
Research on the relation between political trust and voter behaviour has become all 
the more significant given the widespread concern about the alleged decline in 
political trust, although it has to be noted that this concern has received only limited 
support in empirical research (Newton 2007; Bovens and Wille 2008). Similarly, 
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populist parties have gained electoral appeal since the 1980s, which seems to suggest 
a causal relation between both phenomena (Taggart 2004). A distrustful attitude 
towards the political system as a whole has been identified as a compelling mental 
framework allowing us to explain the electoral success of extreme right parties 
(Rydgren 2007). Because of these electoral consequences, low levels of political trust 
could pose a threat to the stability of the party systems in contemporary democracies. 
For the United States it has been demonstrated that distrust is associated with a 
propensity to vote for contenders (Hetherington 1999), and in multi-party systems as 
well, distrust has been linked to an electoral preference for reformist parties (Bélanger 
and Nadeau 2005). In a European context, however, few comprehensive studies on 
this topic exist. Even though the effect of trust on extreme right voting behaviour has 
been studied extensively (e.g. Van der Brug et al. 2000; Ivarsflaten 2008; Söderlund 
& Kestilä-Kekkonen 2009), systematic analyses of the electoral consequences of 
political distrust remain rather scarce (Grönlund and Setälä 2007). In this paper we 
report on the consequences of political distrust for electoral behaviour in Belgium. 
 
The Belgian case offers a number of interesting theoretical perspectives. First of all, 
extremist and populist parties are well-represented in Belgium. During the 2004 
regional elections, the extreme right Vlaams Belang emerged as the second largest 
party in the Flemish region, with 24.2 per cent of the vote, thus becoming one of the 
most successful extreme right parties in Europe. During the June 2009 regional 
elections, the new populist party ‘Lijst Dedecker’ gained a foothold in the regional 
Flemish Parliament with 7.6 per cent of the vote. Second, Belgium has a system of 
compulsory voting, leading to a turnout of 90.4 per cent of all enfranchised voters 
during the June 2009 elections. This implies that distrusting citizens are deterred from 
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taking the exit option, which has led to some speculation that this might be one of the 
causes of the high percentage of protest votes in the country (Pauwels 2010: 8). Third, 
while the relation between dissatisfaction and party preference is relatively 
straightforward in two-party systems, this relation can be considered more complex in 
multi-party systems. The latter are usually associated with coalition governments, 
which render it much more difficult for voters to identify who exactly is responsible 
for the state of affairs. In Belgium, coalition governments are formed at the federal 
and the regional level, generally among four to six political parties at the federal level 
and two to four political parties at the regional level. Moreover, the effective number 
of parties in Belgium is 8.81. Given the wide array of political parties available, it 
remains to be ascertained whether Belgian voters can indeed make clear voting 
decisions based on their level of political trust. 
 
In this article we investigate the relation between political trust and electoral 
behaviour in the regional elections which were held simultaneously with the European 
elections in Belgium on 7 June 2009. The analyses will be based on the results of the 
Belgian National Election Study (PartiRep 2009). This survey was conducted both in 
the Dutch and in the French region of Belgium, in which respect it has to be noted that 
Belgium has two completely segregated party systems, as the Dutch and the French 
political parties do not compete in the same territory (Deschouwer 2009).
1
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Data and Methods 
This analysis is based on the results of the 2009 Belgian Election Study (PartiRep 
2009), which was conducted around the time of the regional elections of 7 June 2009. 
Together with the elections for the European Parliament, regional elections were held 
for the parliaments of the autonomous regions in the country. Since Belgium is a 
federal country these regional parliaments – and their regional governments – have 
considerable authority, which is why the regional elections can be seen as much more 
important for politicians and public opinion than the European elections, which were 
held simultaneously (Deschouwer 2009). 
 
A special feature of the PartiRep Study (2009) is its panel design with two waves of 
pre-electoral questions and one wave of post-electoral questions. This research design 
allows us to investigate electoral behaviour among the Belgian population in the most  
reliable manner.
2
 During the first wave (February-May 2009) 2,331 face-to-face 
interviews were conducted with randomly selected respondents. The response rate 
was 48.3 per cent. This is slightly lower than average in Belgium, but for ethical 
reasons potential respondents were informed upfront that participation preferably 
involved all three waves of the PartiRep Study. This informed consent procedure 
might have reduced the willingness to participate. Subsequently, 1,845 respondents 
(79.2 per cent) participated in the second wave of the PartiRep Study, which was 
conducted in the two weeks preceding the elections of 7 June 2009. Finally, in the 
weeks following the elections, respondents were contacted again to ascertain whether 
their responses during the first two waves actually corresponded to their voting 
behaviour on 7 June. In the current analysis, we will limit ourselves to the first two 
waves of the PartiRep Study. More specifically, in the first wave (February-May 
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2009) political trust was measured, which means that for most respondents these 
results were obtained two or three months prior to the elections, thus ensuring that 
campaign effects had no influence. In the second wave Party preference was 
measured, yielding results that were as close to those of the actual election as 
possible
3
. 
 
In this survey political trust was operationalized by asking respondents how much 
trust they have in the following institutions: political parties, regional government 
(Flemish or Walloon region), regional parliament, Belgian government, Belgian 
parliament and politicians.  For all these institutions respondents could indicate their 
trust levels on a scale ranging from 0 to 10. A factor analysis indicated that these six 
items form a one-dimensional and solid scale, with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.90 (Table 
1).  
 
Table 1 shows that in both regions trust in the regional government and parliament is 
higher than in the federal institutions, although this difference is more outspoken 
among the Dutch-speaking respondents. This larger gap between regional and federal 
institutions among the Dutch-speaking respondents also accounts for the slightly 
weaker internal coherence of the scale among these respondents. It is also worth 
noting that the average trust level in the Walloon region is lower than it is in the 
Flemish region. Despite the success of populist parties in the Flemish region and their 
virtual non-existence in the Walloon region, distrust actually seems to be stronger in 
the Walloon region. 
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Table 1. Political Trust in Belgium 
 Flemish 
region 
(Dutch) 
Walloon 
region 
(French) 
All 
respondents 
Political parties 4.66 4.27 4.53 
Regional Government 6.02 5.32 5.78 
Regional Parliament 5.84 5.14 5.60 
Belgian Government 5.01 5.19 5.07 
Belgian Parliament 5.05 5.14 5.08 
Politicians 4.64 4.69 4.66 
Average score 5.21 4.96 5.13  
Cronbach’s α 0.895 0.922 0.903 
Eigen value 3.944 4.317 4.048 
Explained Variance 65.74 71.95 67.47 
Source: PartiRep Study (2009) n= 2,247. Notes: Entries are scale averages. Data  
are weighted by region to correct for slight differences in age and gender distributions. 
 
In general, we can be confident that the PartiRep Study is quite representative for the 
general population. If we compare the results with those of the European Social 
Survey (ESS 2006), it is striking that the rank order of the institutions is identical, 
with Parliament receiving the highest trust scores, while there is less trust in 
politicians and political parties. The comparison with ESS also demonstrates that it 
makes sense to introduce a distinction between the various institutions. In the 
European Social Survey (2006), respondents were simply questioned about their trust 
in ‘Parliament’, without receiving any information about the specific level.  
ESS results suggest that political trust was slightly lower in the Walloon region than 
in the Flemish region. The PartiRep figures, however, demonstrate that respondents in 
the Flemish region actually have less trust in the federal institutions than respondents 
in the Walloon region. The higher average score in the Flemish region can entirely be 
attributed to the higher level of trust that these respondents have in the regional 
institutions than in the federal institutions. Given the strong one-dimensionality of the 
political trust scale, it is acceptable to use a simple additive scale, ranging from 0 (no 
trust at all) to 60 (very high trust in all six institutions). 
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Discussion 
In our analysis of the Belgian Election Study (PartiRep 2009), the effect of political 
trust on electoral behaviour has been examined in a very specific European context. 
Belgium has two distinct party systems. While populist and protest parties are well 
represented in the Flemish region, these parties are almost non-existent in the Walloon 
region. This implies that distrusting citizens in the Flemish region have the option to 
vote for a viable populist or extreme right party, whereas this option is not available 
for voters in the Walloon region.  
 
The Belgian system of compulsory voting presents a unique case study as to whether 
dissatisfied voters will refrain from voting. The analysis shows that the system of 
compulsory voting leaves a blank or invalid vote as the only available exit option, and 
distrusting voters tend to make use of it. However, if the current system of 
compulsory voting were abolished, distrusting voters indicate that they would no 
longer vote at all. This suggests that invalid voting is preferred because electoral 
abstention is not a viable option in the Belgian case. If compulsory voting were 
abolished, the relation between political trust and invalid voting would be rendered 
insignificant.  
 
It has to be acknowledged that even in a system of compulsory voting, citizens clearly 
have sufficient means to voice their discontent with the main political parties. During 
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the 2009 elections, 9.6 of all Belgian enfranchised voters did not vote. Furthermore, 
an additional 5.7 per cent of all enfranchised citizens cast a blank or invalid vote. 
While it is very likely that both groups are at least partially motivated by political 
distrust, data limitations do not allow us to develop a comprehensive causal model for 
both these groups based on the current survey data available. Finally, another 13.3 per 
cent of all enfranchised voters voted for an extremist or populist party, bringing the 
total of potentially alienated voters to 28.6 per cent of the electorate. 
 
In a system of compulsory voting invalid voting apparently serves as a functional 
equivalent for abstaining. Still, there is a clear difference in the incentive structure. 
Abstaining is the easiest exit option, as it does not require any effort at all from the 
citizen. It could therefore be argued that there is a positive incentive to abstain from 
voting. Invalid voting, however, requires voters to go the polling station, wait their 
turn and cast an invalid vote. In practice, only 6 per cent of Belgian voters bother to 
do so, while it is likely that more than 25 per cent of potential voters would abstain if 
there were no legal obligation. It is thus safe to assume that the system of compulsory 
voting boosts turnout levels in Belgium by at least 20 per cent. 
 
Clearly, this confirms Hypothesis 1: in a system of compulsory voting low levels of 
political trust will lead to invalid and blank voting. Hypothesis 2 is partially supported 
in the Flemish case: even in a multivariate model, low levels of political trust had a 
strong impact on voter preference for the extreme right Vlaams Belang and the 
populist LDD. Somewhat surprisingly, there was also a positive relation with a 
preference for the Flemish Nationalist party. This might be due to the rather populist 
discourse of this party’s leader.  
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For the Walloon case, on the other hand, political trust had far less of an impact on 
party preference. Only the Green party benefited from sentiments of distrust, but the 
effect was much weaker than what we found for the Flemish case. This thus confirms 
the hypothesis developed by Hetherington that the effects of political (dis)trust are 
influenced by the specific political context. If – for various system-related or 
historical reasons – no reform or protest vote is possible, political distrust does not 
seem to have a profound effect on electoral behaviour. If the exit option does not exist 
(for legal reasons) and voice is excluded (for a lack of political opportunities), 
political distrust can only lead to loyalty. Although levels of political trust are actually 
lower in the Walloon region, this does not seem to have an impact on party 
preference. Distrusting voters in the French-speaking part of Belgium are clearly more 
reluctant to express their discontent. This therefore confirms Hypothesis 3: without a 
supply of populist parties, distrusting voters will remain loyal to the traditional 
parties.  
 
It is not within the scope of this paper to try to explain why there is no viable populist 
party in the Walloon region. The minority position of Wallonia within the Belgian 
federation might cause Walloon voters to prefer strong, traditional parties to defend 
the interests of their region, while these parties have also been quite successful in 
maintaining their local presence in the communities of the region. The lower success 
rate of extreme right parties in the Walloon region might be explained by the legacy 
of World War II and the greater cultural diversity in the Walloon region than in the 
Flemish region, despite equal levels of racism and distrust.  
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The literature generally takes for granted that it is ‘good’ for the long term stability of 
a political system if dissatisfied voters can somehow voice their discontent. If the 
hypothesis of Miller and Listhaug (1990) is correct, this implies that voters in the 
Flemish region effectively have an opportunity to express their discontent. Voters in 
the Walloon region, on the other hand, do not seem to have any viable option to 
express their discontent. Theoretically, this confirms the notion developed by 
Bélanger and Nadeau that the electoral consequences of distrust strongly depend on 
the opportunities offered by the electoral and the party system. Although the long-
term consequences of this lack of voice and exit options still require further 
investigation, the data currently available do not show any indications that political 
trust declines more rapidly in the Walloon region, where voters do not have access to 
a viable option to express their distrust, compared to the Flemish region, where 
various political parties offer voters ample opportunity to express their discontent.  
                                               
1. In this article we refer to the Flemish region (ca. 6,000,000 inhabitants) in the North of the country 
and the Walloon region in the South of the country (ca. 4,000,000 inhabitants). For reasons of clarity 
we do not analyse the results of the smaller regions in Belgium (i.e. the bilingual capital Brussels and 
the German language community). For all practical purposes, the Flemish region can be identified as 
the Dutch-speaking area of Belgium, while the Walloon region can be referred to as the French-
speaking region of the country. For more detailed information about the Belgian federal system, we 
refer to Deschouwer (2009).  
2. For budgetary reasons the Belgian Election Study was conducted only in the Flemish and the 
Walloon region. The Brussels bilingual region (10 per cent of the population) and the German-speaking 
community (less than 1 per cent of the population) were excluded. Given that 90 per cent of the 
population was included, we can still be confident that the 2009 PartiRep Election Study is 
representative for Belgium as a whole.  
3. There is no significant relation between political trust and panel dropout, indicating that there is no 
significant relation between political trust and attrition in our sample. 
